The World Is Flat
You can always count on Thomas Friedman to offer important new insight into how the world works now. In his latest book, "The World Is Flat" out this week from Farrar, Straus & Giroux, he makes a compelling case that globalization has collapsed time and distance and raised the notion that someone anywhere on earth can do your job more cheaply. Can Americans rise to the challenge? He's not so sure.
"When the world is flat, you can innovate without having to emigrate.," Friedman writes. "We are about to see creative destruction on steroids."
How did the world get so flat so fast? Friedman says a number of key events and forces converged around 2000:
>> The collapse of the Berlin Wall allowed us to think of the world as a single space.
>> Microsoft Windows 3.0 operating system created a global interface.
>> Netscape went public, triggering the dot.com boom, which, in turn, triggered "massive overinvestment in fiber-optic telecommunications cable.
>> "Workflow" -- software applications and standards that connected computers -- produced a breakthrough in people-to-people and application-to-application connectivity.
>> Outsourcing, offshoring, open-sourcing, insourcing and supply-chaining extended the notion of collaboration, as did "informing" -- the use of Google, Yahoo, and MSN Search.
>> Wireless access and voice over Internet protocol put global collaboration on steroids.
"Hierarchies are being flattened and value is being created less and less within vertical silos and more and more through horizontal collaboration within companies, between companies and among individuals," Friedman writes.
He also points to the three billion people who "walked and often ran onto the playing field" -- the Chinese, Indians, Russians, East Europeans, Latin Americans and Central Asians.
It is this convergence -- of new players, on a new playing field, developing new processes for horizontal collaboration -- that Friedman believes is the most important force shaping global economies and politics in the early 21st century.
Weighed down with their investments in legacy technologies, there is nothing that guarantees that Americans or Western Europeans will continue leading the way.
"The long-term opportunities and challenges that the flattening of the world puts before the United States are profound," Friedman warns.
He believes our nation is plagued with an ambition gap, a numbers gap producing too few scientists and engineers, and an education gap.
How will America respond to what Friedman has rightly called a crisis? That is the most urgent question we face.
Read this book.
You can always count on Thomas Friedman to offer important new insight into how the world works now. In his latest book, "The World Is Flat" out this week from Farrar, Straus & Giroux, he makes a compelling case that globalization has collapsed time and distance and raised the notion that someone anywhere on earth can do your job more cheaply. Can Americans rise to the challenge? He's not so sure.
"When the world is flat, you can innovate without having to emigrate.," Friedman writes. "We are about to see creative destruction on steroids."
How did the world get so flat so fast? Friedman says a number of key events and forces converged around 2000:
>> The collapse of the Berlin Wall allowed us to think of the world as a single space.
>> Microsoft Windows 3.0 operating system created a global interface.
>> Netscape went public, triggering the dot.com boom, which, in turn, triggered "massive overinvestment in fiber-optic telecommunications cable.
>> "Workflow" -- software applications and standards that connected computers -- produced a breakthrough in people-to-people and application-to-application connectivity.
>> Outsourcing, offshoring, open-sourcing, insourcing and supply-chaining extended the notion of collaboration, as did "informing" -- the use of Google, Yahoo, and MSN Search.
>> Wireless access and voice over Internet protocol put global collaboration on steroids.
"Hierarchies are being flattened and value is being created less and less within vertical silos and more and more through horizontal collaboration within companies, between companies and among individuals," Friedman writes.
He also points to the three billion people who "walked and often ran onto the playing field" -- the Chinese, Indians, Russians, East Europeans, Latin Americans and Central Asians.
It is this convergence -- of new players, on a new playing field, developing new processes for horizontal collaboration -- that Friedman believes is the most important force shaping global economies and politics in the early 21st century.
Weighed down with their investments in legacy technologies, there is nothing that guarantees that Americans or Western Europeans will continue leading the way.
"The long-term opportunities and challenges that the flattening of the world puts before the United States are profound," Friedman warns.
He believes our nation is plagued with an ambition gap, a numbers gap producing too few scientists and engineers, and an education gap.
How will America respond to what Friedman has rightly called a crisis? That is the most urgent question we face.
Read this book.


